It is frequently claimed that high ATM surcharges actually attract customers to the banks that impose them, particularly if they operate large ATM networks. By exploiting as "natural experiments" two events associated with the lifting of surcharge bans in Iowa and in the states that neighbor Iowa, this paper seeks to test for the implications of this phenomenon as it applies to the market shares of banking institutions and to several aspects of market structure. Consistent with these implications, results of "difference-indifference" analyses suggest that the shares of larger market participants increase, the shares of smaller market participants decrease, market concentration increases, and the number of market competitors decreases after the lifting of surcharge bans. 
Introduction
When a depositor of one bank conducts a transaction using an ATM owned by another, the depositor may incur two fees: the so-called foreign fee, levied by the depositor's own bank, and another fee, known as a surcharge, levied by the institution that owns the ATM. This latter fee has been the subject of some controversy. In popular commentary in the press and on Capitol Hill, it has been referred to as "double charging," since it represents a second charge on the same transaction.
A more substantive allegation, and one of perhaps more interest to the economist, is the claim that the ATM surcharge provides an example of a price that can actually attract customers to the firm charging a higher price. The reason is that surcharges typically are not levied for the use of a bank's ATMs by the bank's own depositors.
Thus, a higher surcharge levied by a bank, particularly one that operates numerous ATMs, provides an incentive for depositors of banks with fewer ATMs to switch their accounts to the bank to avoid the fee. Thus, while a bank's surcharge may discourage the depositors of other banks from using the bank's ATMs (the "direct effect" of surcharging), it may actually encourage them to switch their accounts to the surcharging bank, and there is every reason to believe that this "indirect effect," as we will call it, is more pronounced, the larger the number of ATMs that the surcharging bank has to offer ATM users.
The existence of this "indirect effect" has been central to discussions regarding the desirability of bans on surcharges. Some of this discussion has focused on the impact of surcharging on small banks, presumably because of a concern for the state of bank competition in the long run. Because of the indirect effect, surcharging may harm small banks either because it provides an incentive for depositors of small banks to switch their accounts to larger institutions with large networks of ATMs, or because it induces smaller banks to lower retail fees or increase deposit rates to prevent, at least in part, the loss of deposits. As discussed in more detail below, a few recent contributions have sought to assess the broader welfare implications of surcharge bans, taking into account this indirect effect.
This paper seeks to test for the existence of the indirect effect by examining the impact of surcharge bans on the market shares of banking institutions and on several aspects of market structure by exploiting as "natural experiments" two events associated with the lifting of a surcharge ban in Iowa and in the states that neighbor Iowa. The first of these events occurred on April 1, 1996, when the Cirrus and Plus national ATM networks modified their operating rules to allow ATM owners to impose surcharges.
Surcharging thereafter spread rapidly in the states that neighbor Iowa, but, because of state legislation, the ban remained firmly in force in Iowa. The second event occurred in March of 2002, when a court decision resulted in the lifting of the ban in Iowa as well.
The statistical approach employed is that of a "difference-in-difference" analysis, wherein changes in bank-specific market shares (as well as related measures of market structure) occurring over a period in which a surcharge ban was lifted are compared to equivalently measured changes occurring over the same time period in neighboring states where no change in surcharge restrictions occurred. This approach, though simple, avoids some potential problems inherent in, and at the very least provides a useful alternative to, the more commonly employed structural econometric analyses appearing recently in the literature. Consistent with the presence of an "indirect effect," results suggest that the shares of larger market participants increase, the shares of smaller market participants decrease, market concentration increases, and the number of market competitors decreases after the lifting of surcharge bans.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature, while section 3 outlines the "difference in difference" analysis employed. Section 4 discusses the empirical model, and section 5 describes the data and variable measurement. Section 6 presents results, and a final section concludes.
The Literature
A number of recent studies have addressed the implications of bank surcharges and policies to ban them. Massoud and Bernhardt (2002a, 2202b) develop gametheoretic spatial models in which the pricing of ATM services by banks, the choice of home bank by depositors, and (in the case of 2002a) the use of ATMs by depositors are endogenized. The equilibrium delivers a number of observed regularities: Banks do not charge their own depositors for ATM usage but charge high surcharges for the use of their ATMs by nondepositors. Also, larger banks set higher account fees and demand higher surcharges for ATM use than smaller banks.
1 Central to their model is the assumption that banks extract surplus efficiently from depositors but not from nondepositors of the bank. So they set high ATM surcharges for nondepositors in order to increase the number of their depositors (what we have termed the "indirect effect").
In terms of welfare implications, their model implies that surcharge bans raise bank profits, have an ambiguous impact on total consumer welfare, and raise total producer plus consumer surplus.
This latter issue-the impact of surcharging and surcharge bans on consumer or total welfare-has been addressed empirically in several recent works that employ detailed structural models of depositor behavior and, in some cases, bank or ATM owner behavior as well. As Knittel and Stango (December 2004) note, surcharging reduces consumer welfare by making the ATMs of competing banks in essence "less compatible," but it improves consumer welfare through the increase in available ATMs that surcharging can bring. To address this tradeoff, they estimate a structural demand model of bank choice, and this yields the impact of surcharges and ATM availability on depositor utility. These estimated effects, together with some rough estimates of the relationship between surcharging and the number of ATMs that banks find it in their interest to deploy, allows them to assess this tradeoff between the welfare enhancing and welfare reducing effects of surcharging. They conclude that the increased availability of ATMs resulting from surcharging is likely to more than offset the harm from higher fees in markets with higher population densities, where, because of higher travel costs, depositors place a higher value on ATM availability. Their findings suggest that the opposite may be true, however, in markets with low population densities. Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2004) things, that surcharging leads to significantly higher market shares on the part of larger market participants, significantly smaller marker shares on the part of small market participants, and, consequently, significantly higher levels of market concentration. As we will see, this paper reports similar findings, based on a very different methodology.
In another paper, Knittel and Stango (September 2004 ) employ a pooled timeseries of bank observations over the period from 1994 to 1999 to estimate the impact of ATM deployment and surcharging on willingness to pay for deposit accounts and, separately, on bank deposit shares. They find that incompatibility, as measured by interconnection fees (primarily surcharges) or state laws that allowed surcharging, leads to lower willingness to pay for deposit accounts and that incompatibility benefits firms with large ATM fleets. Since the paper employs observations both before and after the general relaxation of surcharge bans that occurred in 1996, it may be thought of as a "difference-in-difference analysis," wherein changes observed from a period before to a period after 1996 for banks in states where surcharging was allowed both before and after 1996 are compared to changes over the same years observed for banks that were allowed to surcharge only from 1996 on. A potential shortcoming of this particular aspect of the paper, as the authors readily note, is that few banks in states that allowed surcharges before 1996 may have actually chrged them at that time, implying little difference between the two groups.
One empirical study reported recently by Hannan, Kiser, Prager, and McAndrews (2003) found (if it may be so described) indirect evidence of the indirect effect. In assessing the likelihood that a bank with ATMs will levy a surcharge on ATM users that are not depositors of the bank, these authors note that if banks consider the potential for surcharges to attract depositors, then one should see more surcharging in markets where attracting new customers through this policy is likely to be more successful. They note two characteristics that might index relative success in attracting new customers. First, markets in which banks with small market shares make up collectively a large proportion of the market should provide a relatively large number of depositors who could be more readily induced to switch to a larger surcharging bank. The reason is that the difference in convenience between a small bank with few ATMs and a large one with many ATMs can be quite pronounced, and such a market provides a larger number of small bank depositors for whom that is true. The second characteristic is the degree of in-migration into the market, since people new to the market do not face switching costs to deter changes in deposit relationships. Consistent with the existence of an indirect effect, Hannan, Kiser, Prager, and McAndrews (2003) find that banks are more likely to surcharge in markets that experience higher rates of in-migration. However, no consistent, statistically significant relationship between surcharging and the variable measuring the cumulative market share of banks with small market shares was observed.
Another examination of an implication of the indirect effect was reported by Prager (2001 extreme value over all individuals and products; a single generic deposit rate or deposit fee may be used to encompass all the different types of deposit accounts at banks and thrifts (from large CDs to small transaction accounts), and (because available data do not allow the researcher to distinguish between the deposits of individuals and businesses) businesses satisfy the same list of detailed assumptions as do individuals in their choice of financial institution.
Many of these assumptions may be useful simplifications, whose violation makes no real difference to the predictions that stem from them. They do, however, highlight the desirability of checking the predictions of the approach, when possible, with an alternative and simpler one that, while also subject to a number shortcomings, is not generally subject to the same shortcomings. The natural experiment made possible by the uniqueness of Iowa banking law makes possible such an alternative look.
A "Difference-in-Difference" Examination of the Impact of Surcharge Bans
The empirical approach pursued in this paper exploits the natural experiment Wisconsin. 4 Thus, surcharging appears to have been nearly universal during this period in the states that allowed it.
In contrast to these states, Iowa maintained a ban on surcharges until March of 2002. The 1999 survey of Iowa banks produced only 3 of 18 surveyed ATM-owning banks responding that they imposed a surcharge, while the 2001 survey found only 3 of 24 such banks indicating that they surcharged. While it is unclear why a few small banks would respond that they are surcharging ATM users in a state that bans the practice, it is clear that the ban, on the whole, was effective in making surcharging a rare, if not nonexistent, practice in the state.
To assess the changes in market shares and changes in commonly measured aspects of market structure brought about by surcharging, the approach taken will be to compare the changes in bank-specific market shares and market-specific measures of market structure occurring over a period in which a surcharge ban was lifted with equivalently measured changes occurring over the same period in states where no change in a surcharge ban occurred. Because surcharge bans were, in essence, lifted in the five states neighboring Iowa in April of 1996, but not in Iowa, and because the Iowa ban was lifted by a court decision in March of 2002, whereas the ban had long since been lifted in neighboring states, these two dates are the events surrounding which difference-indifference analysis can be conducted.
In assessing the results of the analysis, it will be useful to keep in mind that, in response to the lifting of a surcharge ban, the optimal level of bank decision variables other than the surcharge may also change. Banking organizations are likely to change the number of ATMs that they offer their customers, and they can make themselves more or less attractive to depositors by altering deposit rates and other fees, such as the foreign fee. Thus, any observed changes in deposit shares or other variables of interest will presumably reflect the impact of induced changes in these items as well. Further, since it may take some time for banks to change appreciably the size of their ATM networks and for the institutional choice of depositors to reflect those changes, it may take some time for deposit shares and other variables of interest to reach their new equilibrium.
Another issue relevant to this type of analysis concerns the possibility that other relevant regulatory changes confound results attributed to the lifting of surcharge bans. A brief discussion of this issue is presented below in light of the results obtained.
The Empirical Model
While difference-in-difference analyses are commonly conducted using extensive panel data sets in which the units of observation are observed multiple times both before and after the intervention studied, Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) warn that, due primarily to serial correlation, such studies often severely underestimate the standard errors associated with the effect of the intervention. They find, through
Monte Carlo simulations, that two approaches in particular can be used to successfully deal with this problem. The first and simplest involves removing the time series dimension by aggregating the data into two periods: pre-and post-intervention. The second entails correction for the serial correlation by allowing for an unrestricted covariance structure over time within groups (markets or states, in this application), with or without an assumption that the error terms in all groups follow the same process. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) note that the first approach is preferable to the second when the number of different groups (states) is relatively small.
The approach taken in this paper is to conduct separate pre-and post-intervention comparisons, where the pre-intervention state is measured as of the year before the event, and the post-intervention state is measured as of specific years after the event. This approach avoids the problems of serial correlation noted by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, while at the same time allowing for a relatively agnostic look at the time it takes for any event-related changes to take place. ε is an error term.
First differencing of (1) yields: , is a dummy variable that receives the value of one if the bank operates in a state that imposed a surcharge ban at time t-1 but not at t, and zero if it operates in a state where a surcharge ban was imposed at both time periods or imposed during neither time period. 5 The strength of this approach is, of course, that it controls for any time-invariant bank or market characteristic or for any characteristic for which the change from time t-1 to time t is the same for all observations. The choice of a sample that is restricted to one area of the country, as well 5 The case in which a surcharge ban was in effect at the later time period but not in effect at the earlier time period is not observed in the data.
as other restrictions to be discussed below, is made to take fullest advantage of this form of statistical control. The resulting estimating equation for the case in which the impact of surcharging on a market characteristic, rather than a bank characteristic, is the primary interest is equivalent to (2), except that, of course, the term indicating the change in bank characteristics is excluded.
The basic prediction of the indirect effect of surcharging is that, with the lifting of a surcharge ban, financial institutions with large numbers of ATMs in the market will gain market share at the expense of institutions with few or no ATMs, all else equal. In addition, it also suggests that, because of the competitive disadvantage that might result from surcharging, some small banks with few ATMs might leave the market over time, and fewer such banks might find it in their interest to enter the market.
Data on bank-specific ATM deployments are not generally available for the financial institutions in the states of interest over the time periods of interest. However, Hannan, Kiser, Prager, and McAndrews ( 2003) collected data on bank-specific market ATM shares for a nationwide sample of over 500 banks for the year 1998, and these data indicate a correlation of approximately .77 between bank-specific deposit shares and bank-specific ATM shares. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to use deposit-based measures of market shares as a proxy for the share of ATMs in a market.
With this in mind, a possible all-encompassing measure of the potential "structural" effects of surcharging is the common Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration, defined as the sum of squared deposit or account shares. For the purpose of this study, the measure must be adjusted to exclude any changes in underlying market shares that occur over time because of mergers. Assuming that banks with greater market shares also tend to be those with more ATMs in the market, such a measure, adjusted to exclude the impact of mergers, is predicted to increase with the lifting of a surcharge ban, either because of an increase in the disparity of market shares induced by surcharging or because of a reduction in the number of competitors over time induced by surcharging.
The results of explicit tests of these individual components of any observed change in this measure will also be reported. This will include the results of difference-in difference analyses of the change in bank-specific market shares to examine more explicitly whether, with the legalization of surcharging, the shares of large banks gain at the expense of the shares of smaller institutions. Also presented will be the results of an explicit tests of the impact of the lifting of surcharge bans on the number of market competitors over time.
The Data and Variable Measurement
The markets employed in the analysis are Labor Market Areas, as defined by the Hannan and Prager (2003) , Berger and Hannan (1989) , and Calem and Carlino (1991) .
Minneapolis, for example) are substantially larger than the largest found in Iowa, only markets that are not part of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are included in the analysis.
In calculating market shares, one may use either the dollar volume of deposits or the number of accounts. Data on the dollar volume of deposits of a depository institution are available by branch from the FDIC's Summary of Deposits, which means that market shares based on this measure can be calculated directly by market in the case of banks that happen to span more than one market. A potential shortcoming is that these data can include substantial business deposits. The number of accounts of a bank probably trakts better the extent of its consumer deposits, but these data are available only at the institution level, which means that the number of deposit accounts that an institution has in a defined market (for institutions that operate in more than one market) must be Market shares will be calculated as the number of accounts held by an institution in a given market, divided by the sum of all accounts in the market estimated for all banks and thrift institutions operating in the market. In tracing the relationship between the change in market shares over time and the lifting of a surcharge ban, it is important to adjust for the potentially major changes in market share that can result from mergers.
The primary concern is the case of a merger between institutions in the same market, whereby observed market share would increase solely because of the merger. In these cases, the procedure followed was to combine the market shares of those institutions that were to merge by the latest period observed and to compare the changes in market shares on this pro forma basis. Other variables relevant to the analysis were also adjusted accordingly.
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Other data sources used include the FDIC's Summary of Deposits (to determine the number of branches that each banks operates in each market), and the US Census of Population (to measure the population of each market).
The Results
Results associated with the lifting of the surcharge ban in states neighboring Iowa in 1996 and those associated with the lifting of the surcharge ban in Iowa in 2002 will be presented separately.
The Lifting of the Surcharge Ban in States Neighboring Iowa. Table 1 such that time t-1 occurs before 1996 and t occurs after 1996) and receives the value of zero if it is located in Iowa. 8 The author would like to thank Robert Avery for developing the program that allowed these adjustments to be made efficiently. A small minority of the observations that form the basis of the analysis were adjusted in this way, and inclusion of a dummy variable indicating that the observation was subject to this adjustment indicates no material difference in the results of interest.
Because it is not clear how long it takes for a change in the legal status of surcharging to reflect itself in an appreciable change in market shares, market concentration, and other measures of interest, the approach taken is to estimate the relationship between the change in these measures and their determinants over three time periods that bracket the 1996 event: 1995-1997, 1995-1999, and 1995-2001 . Because of the plentiful number of bank observations, this approach seems preferable to a more restrictive one that attempts to parameterize (or assume) differences in the change for different time periods.
As noted above, observed changes in market concentration may result if surcharge status influences the market shares of large market participants relative to small ones, or if it influences the decision by financial institutions to leave or enter the market over time. Thus, market concentration, and more specifically the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, is arguably an over-all measure of the likely "structural" effects of surcharging, and we will focus on this measure first.
The first three columns of table 2 report the results of OLS regressions in which, for each of the three periods examined, the change in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration, defined as the sum of squared market shares (with its change denoted hhi ∆ ), is regressed on We now consider more explicitly the impact of surcharging on the market shares of institutions that remained in the market over the time periods examined. As a first look, table 3 reports the average change in market shares for each of the three study periods, for Iowa and the neighboring "surcharge states," and, most importantly, for four different ranges of initial market share. These data suggest that "regression toward the mean" is at work, since institutions with small initial market shares exhibit, on average, an increase in market shares, while institutions with large initial shares experience, on average, a decrease. The important point to note, however, is that in Iowa, where surcharges were banned over the periods examined, institutions with initial market shares less than 0.1 fared "better" in terms of subsequent market share changes than did this event provides another opportunity to investigate the impact of the lifting of a surcharge ban using the same difference-in-difference methodology. The one obvious limitation is that the impact of the lifting of the ban in this case can be followed for no more than two years after the event, since 2004 is the last year for which data are available. As in the analysis of the earlier periods, the data are adjusted to exclude the impact of mergers and acquisitions among market participants occurring during the period. Tables 5 and 6 
Summary and Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to test for the impact of ATM surcharging These results also provide fairly strong and consistent evidence of the much discussed "indirect effect" of surcharging, whereby the imposition of a surcharge (particularly by substantial market competitors with large ATM networks) actually attracts depositors to the bank, since this underlying relationship predicts all of the reported findings.
A clear limitation of this analysis is that it does not allow us to assess the full welfare implications of surcharging. Among other changes, legalization of surcharging may provide greater incentive for financial institutions to invest in extensive ATM networks, providing greater convenience for their depositors. These results do demonstrate, however, (in a manner not dependent on the long list of detailed assumptions common to more structural approaches) that changes in market structure result from a change in the legal status of surcharging, and these changes appear to be economically meaningful. A binary variable set equal to one if the institution operates in a state in which a surcharge ban was in effect at time t-1,but not at time t, and zero otherwise.
∆branches
The change in the number of branches operated by the institution over the time period studied.
S t
The number of deposit accounts held by the bank or thrift, divided by the total number of deposit accounts estimated to be held in the market by banks and thrifts, calculated at time t. The change in the population of market k.
∆hhi
The change in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculated on the basis of account shares (see above) for the market in which the bank or thrift operates and adjusted for mergers occurring over the period examined.
∆numbanks Change in the number of banks and thrifts in the market over the period examined, adjusted for mergers. 1995-1997 1995-1999 1995-2001 1995-1997 1995-1999 1995-2001 Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The Symbols **, *, and + denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Note: Numbers of observations are in parentheses. Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The Symbols **, *, and + denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The Symbols **, *, and + denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
